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SIXTH AMENDMENT-THE DEMISE
OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED
JUROR BIAS
Smith v. Phillips, 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Smith v. Phillips,' the United States Supreme Court held that a
juror who seeks employment with the prosecutor's office during the
course of a criminal defendant's trial does not necessarily compromise
the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.2 The Court
did not deny that an individual biased in favor of either party cannot be
impartial or that a criminal jury including such an individual violates
the guarantees of the sixth amendment.3 The Court also recognized
that the juror's actions in Phillips raised a serious question of whether he
was biased in favor of the prosecution.4 Nevertheless, the Court held
that a post-trial evidentiary hearing could adequately determine
whether the juror was prejudiced based largely upon the juror's own
testimony.5 Because the juror in Phillips did not admit to bias at the
post-trial hearing, and because the defendant could offer no independ-
ent evidence of "actual" bias, the Supreme Court rejected the defend-
ant's sixth amendment challenge to his conviction. 6 By deciding that
the juror's disclaimers sufficiently established his impartiality, the Court
severely undermined Phillips's sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury. Under the circumstances in Phillips, the Supreme Court should
have deemed the juror biased as a matter of law, rather than insisting
upon proof of "actual" bias in a post-trial hearing.
1 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
2 The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
. " U.S. CONST. amend VI. The sixth amendment right to an impartial jury is applica-
ble to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
3 See, e.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S.
544 (1964); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
4 See 102 S. Ct. 948 ("Smith's job application. . . requir[ed] a post-trial hearing on juror
bias .... 2).
5 Id. at 946 & n.7. See also id. at 951-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 944, 948. Se a/so id. at 951-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Court also made a broader ruling in Phillips. It decided to
abandon altogether the position that courts should generally deem a ju-
ror biased as a matter of law when an average man under the juror's
circumstances would not be able to reach an impartial verdict. A crimi-
nal defendant can no longer rely upon this "implied bias doctrine" to
establish a sixth amendment violation, but must instead prove "actual"
juror bias under even the most suspicious of circumstances.
7
II. SMITH V. PHILLIPS
A. THE FACTS
On March 29, 1972, a grand jury charged William R. Phillips with
the 1968 murders of a pimp and a prostitute and the attempted murder
of a customer at their bordello.8 The former New York City police of-
ficer's first trial for these offenses commenced before a New York jury on
June 28, 1972. 9 In August of 1972, the judge declared a mistrial because
the jury was deadlocked ten to two for acquittal. 10 Phillips's second trial
on these charges began on September 16, 1974 before the New York
County Supreme Court."I
Voir dire for the second trial commenced on September 17, 1974.12
One prospective juror, John Smith, stated that he had been employed as
a store detective between 1972 and 1973. He acknowledged that he
hoped to work overseas with the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency and
that he had already submitted an application for the position. 13 Despite
Smith's interest in law enforcement, defense counsel did not challenge
him, and the court swore Smith in as a juror on September 23, 1974.14
7 See id. at 945 ("[T]he remedy for allegation of juror partiality is a hearing in which the
defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias."); id. at 946 ("[D]ue process means a jury
capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it. . . . Such determina-
tions may properly be made at a hearing like that ordered in Remmer and held in this case.").
See also id. at 952 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, [the majority] would apparently insist
on proof of actual bias, not only when a juror had applied for employment with the prosecu-
tor's office, but also when the juror was already employed in the prosecutor's office, or when
he served as a prosecuting attorney.").
8 Phillips v. Smith, 632 F.2d 1019, 1020 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
9 Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. 1365, 1366-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), at'd, 632 F.2d 1019 (2d
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
10 632 F.2d at 1020.
11 Id.
12 People v. Phillips, 87 Misc. 2d 613, 614, 384 N.Y.S.2d 906, 907 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975),
aj'd, 52 A.D.2d 758, 384 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 39 N.Y.2d 949, 352
N.E.2d 894, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1039 (1976).
13 Id. at 619, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
14 632 F.2d at 1020. The remaining eleven jurors and four alternate jurors were selected
within the next ten days. Id.
The majority and dissenting Supreme Court opinions disagreed over the significance of
the defense counsel's failure to challenge Smith. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion at least
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After voir dire, on the same day that he was sworn in, John Smith
met with Rudolph Fontaine, a criminal court officer. 15 Fontaine men-
tioned that there was an opening for a major felony investigator at the
New York County District Attorney's office, the office preparing to pros-
ecute Phillips. Smith expressed interest in the position. Accordingly,
Fontaine asked employees of the District Attorney's office about the ap-
plication procedure.'
6
About halfway through Phillips's trial, John Smith submitted his
application to the District Attorney's office for the position of major fel-
ony investigator.' 7 Smith's application first reached the desk of Assis-
tant District Attorney Conboy.'8 On November 9, 1974, Conboy gave it
to the Assistant District Attorney primarily responsible for reviewing ap-
plications, Joan Sudolnik. She in turn forwarded the application to
John Lang, another assistant to the District Attorney.19 On November
13, Fontaine spoke to Assistant District Attorney Robert Holmes about
Smith's application, and informed him that Smith was on the Phillips
jury.20 Holmes immediately informed Sudolnik that one of her job ap-
plicants was currently hearing the Phillips case. Sudolnik told her secre-
tary and Lang not to contact Smith until after the trial.
21
On November 14, Sudolnik met with the Assistant District Attor-
neys prosecuting Phillips, Jack Litman and Phillip LaPenta, to advise
them of the Smith problem. Litman told Sudolnik that he did not want
to see anything relating to Smith's application.22 Litman and LaPenta
hinted that, since the defense counsel was satisfied as to the impartiality of a juror with an
interest in law enforcement, Smith's subsequent application to the office prosecuting Phillips
would not effect the defense counsel's opinion of Smith's impartiality. 102 S. Ct. at 943-94
n.4. Justice Marshall pointed out, however, that since the defendant was a former police
officer, Smith's general interest in law enforcement would not necessarily work to Phillips's
disadvantage. He argued that a juror's general interest in law enforcement is far different
from ajuror's fear that his future employment may rest upon his finding the defendant guilty.
Id. at 952 & n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
15 632 F.2d at 1020.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1021. Smith's October 23, 1974 application stated that "I understand that a
Federal [sic] Funded investigation unit is being formed in your office to investigate major
felonies. I wish to apply for a position as an investigator. Attached is my resume. Letters of
recommendation will be furnished upon request. Thank you for your consideration." 485 F.
Supp. at 1367 n.2.
Several days later, Fontaine introduced Smith to Mario Piazza, a jury warden for the
New York Supreme Court. 632 F.2d at 1020-21. Thereafter, Smith met regularly with Fon-
taine and Piazza to discuss the progress of his application through the District Attorney's
office. 102 S. Ct. at 952 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
t8 632 F.2d at 1021; 485 F. Supp. 1368 n.3.
19 632 F.2d at 1020-21.
20 Id. at 1021.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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then conferred about the matter and decided that they had no duty to
inform the court or defense counsel about Smith's application because
Smith had already expressed an interest in law enforcement during voir
dire.23
On November 21, the jury found Phillips guilty of both murders
and of the attempted murder.24 The next day, Smith called the New
York County District Attorney's office to check on his application.25
Sudolnik did not return his call, so Smith asked his former employer,
Walter Reilly, to contact the District Attorney's office. Reilly reached
Sudolnik, gave Smith a good recommendation, and mentioned that
Smith had been on the Phillips jury.26 Sudolnik replied that Smith's
application would be considered with the others.
27
On December 4, 1974, LaPenta informed Chief Assistant District
Attorney John Keenan about Smith's application.28 Keenan then con-
ferred with District Attorney Richard Kuh about the matter. On De-
cember 9, Kuh told the trial court and defense counsel that Smith had
applied to his office during the trial and that his office had known that
Smith was a juror.29 Phillips's attorney moved to set aside the verdict
pursuant to section 330.30(2) of New York Criminal Procedure Law,
and the trial judge held a post-trial hearing in accordance with section
330.40 of New York Criminal Procedure Law.
30
23 Id. The prosecutors did, however, inform the court of the circumstances surrounding
another juror to the Phillips case, Lawrence Bethel. On November 18th, two days before the
jury retired to deliberate, the prosecutors disclosed that Bethel had been arrested on a narcot-
ics charge and had agreed to cooperate with the government. 102 S. Ct. at 958 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); 87 Misc. 2d at 614-15, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 908. The court accordingly dismissed
Bethel from the Phillips jury and replaced him with an alternate juror. 102 S. Ct. at 958
(Marshall, J., dissenting). When the jury began to deliberate on November 20th, three alter-
nate jurors remained. 102 S. Ct. at 944.
24 Id.; 632 F.2d at 1020. Smith is serving concurrent sentences of up to a life term of
imprisonment. 485 F. Supp. at 1366.
25 102 S. Ct. at 952 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 632 F.2d at 1021.
26 632 F.2d at 1021.
27 Id.
28 Id.; 87 Misc. 2d at 618, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
29 102 S. Ct. at 944.
30 Id. at 942-44. Section 330.30 provides in pertinent part:
At any time after rendition of a verdict of guilty and before sentence, the court may,
upon motion of the defendant, set aside or modify the verdict or any part thereof upon
the following grounds:
(2) That during the trial there occurred, out of the presence of the court, improper
conduct by a juror, or improper conduct by another person in relation to a juror, which
may have affected a substantial right of the defendant and which was not known to the
defendant prior to the rendition of the verdict. . ..
N.Y. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW § 330.30 (McKinney 1971). § 330.40(2) provides that:
IMPLIEDJUROR BIAS
B. THE LOWER COURTS' DECISIONS
At the conclusion of the post-trial hearing, the trial judge found
that Phillips had not sustained his burden of proving that Smith had
impaired his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.31 Judge Birns
based his finding in part on Smith's testimony that "I swore on oath to
listen to the evidence and to render a verdict on that evidence. I did
so."32 He also considered Smith's testimony that his desire for employ-
ment with the prosecutor's office did not affect his verdict: "That didn't
enter my mind; I didn't think about it that way." 33 Smith's statements
during voir dire also influenced the trial judge, who found that Smith's
application reflected no more than the "predilection for law enforce-
ment" made evident during Smith's pretrial questioning.34 Although
the judge characterized Smith's activities as "unprecedented impru-
dence on the part of a juror" and the prosecutors' failure to inform the
court of Smith's application as "unique misjudgment," he found that
Smith's application did not reflect a premature conclusion about the
defendant's guilt.35 The appellate division of the New York supreme
court affirmed this finding,36 and the New York Court of Appeals de-
nied leave to appeal.
37
Having exhausted his state court remedies, Phillips filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.38 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued the
(d) The Court must grant the motion if:
(i) The moving papers allege a ground constituting legal basis for the motion; and
(ii) Such papers contain sworn allegations of all facts essential to support such
ground; and
(iii) All the essential facts are conceded by the people to be true.
(e) The court may deny the motion if:
(i) The moving papers do not allege any ground constituting legal basis for the
motion; or
(ii) The moving papers do not contain sworn allegations of all facts essential to
support the motion.
(f) If the court does not determine the motion pursuant to paragraphs (d) or (e), it must
conduct a hearing and make findings of fact essential to the determination thereof;
(g) Upon such a hearing, the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence every fact essential to support the motion.
Id. § 330.40(2).
31 87 Misc. 2d at 621, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
32 Id. at 621, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 911-12.
33 Id. at 621, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 631, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 918. See supra note 17
36 52 A.D.2d 758, 384 N.Y.S.2d 715 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
37 39 N.Y.2d 949, 352 N.E.2d 894, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1039 (1976).
38 632 F.2d at 1020; 485 F. Supp. at 1369. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
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writ, holding that Smith was biased as a matter of law and that his
presence on the Phillips jury therefore violated the defendant's right to
an impartial jury.39 The court recognized that "actual" bias exists only
when there is evidence of a juror's prejudiced state of mind,40 and it
agreed with the state trial court that the evidence offered at the post-
trial hearing was insufficient to show actual bias. 41 The court found,
however, that when a juror applies for employment with the prosecuting
attorney's office during the course of the defendant's trial, and that ap-
plication is still pending during the period of the jury's deliberations, a
court must conclusively presume that the juror is biased.42 Such a con-
clusive presumption, the court pointed out, is not unreasonably burden-
some since the facts in Phillips are not likely to recur often.
43
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit did not rule upon the district court's finding that Smith was im-
pliedly biased because "the 'average' juror in his position 'would indeed
be likely to favor the prosecutor's position.' "44 Instead, it affirmed the
district court's decision on the ground that the prosecutors' misconduct
deprived the defendant of a fair trial.45 To condone the prosecutors'
withholding of information which cast substantial doubt upon Smith's
impartiality would prejudice the defendant and would "ill serve to
maintain public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process." '46
The court relied on Brady v. Maiyland47 and United States v. Agurs48 to
hold that a "prosecutor may not keep silent when he knows that a juror
has applied to become his employee. '49
C. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
In Smith v. Phillips, the Supreme Court rejected Phillips's implied
bias and prosecutorial misconduct claims and reversed the decisions
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion incorrectly states that Smith waited four years after
the New York Court of Appeals denied him leave to appeal to pursue habeas corpus relief.
102 S. Ct. at 943. Since Smith filed his habeas corpus petition in April of 1979, 485 F. Supp.
at 1369, and the New York Court of Appeals issued its decision in May of 1976, 39 N.Y.2d
949, 352 N.E.2d 894, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1039, only three years had elapsed between the time that
Smith exhausted his state court remedies and the time that he filed his petition for habeas
corpus.
39 485 F. Supp. at 1371-72.
40 Id. at 1370.
41 Id. at 1370-71.
42 Id. at 1369, 1371-72.
43 Id. at 1372.
44 632 F.2d at 1022 (quoting 485 F. Supp. at 1371-72).
45 Id. at 1022-24.
46 Id. at 1023.
47 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
48 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
49 632 F.2d at 1024.
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granting him habeas corpus relief.50 Writing for the majority, Justice
Rehnquist first disposed of the defendant's claim that "a court cannot
possible ascertain the impartiality of a juror [in Smith's position] by re-
lying solely upon the testimony of the juror in question."'51 In holding
that a court could indeed do so, Justice Rehnquist did not invoke the
analysis normally applied to claims of implied bias, under which the
court analyzes the facts and decides whether, in general, "men under
such circumstances ought to be considered as capable of hearing fairly
and of deciding impartially. '52 Instead, the majority dismissed the de-
fendant's implied bias claim by holding that the sixth amendment is
triggered only by proof ofactua/ bias. "This Court has long held that the
remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the de-
fendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias."'5 3 The Court made it
clear that a defendant can only prove such "actual bias" by proving
subjective bias: "Respondent correctly notes that determinations made
in [this] type [of] hearing will frequently turn upon the testimony of the
juror in question . . . ,,54 Since Smith did not admit to bias at the
hearing before the New York trial court and Phillips could not provide
independent evidence of Smith's prejudice, the Supreme Court held
that Phillips had not established a violation of the sixth amendment.55
The remainder of the majority's analysis followed tautologically
from its assumption that an evidentiary hearing will adequately reveal
any prejudice on the part of a juror. Justice Rehnquist pointed out that
the resolution of prosecutorial misconduct claims turns on the fairness of
the trial rather than the culpability of the prosecutor.5 6 Since an eviden-
tiary hearing will adequately reveal juror prejudice, and since Phillips's
hearing did not reveal such prejudice, Smith's conduct did not harm
Phillips. Because Smith's actions did not affect the fairness of the trial,
50 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982).
51 102 S. Ct. at 945. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell
joined Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion.
52 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
53 102 S. Ct. at 945. Justice Rehnquist cited five cases in support of his claim that a
hearing into actual bias is an adequate remedy for claims of juror impartiality: Chandler v.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954); Dennis v.
United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950); Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948); United
States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936). For a discussion of these cases, see in/ra text accompany-
ing notes 83-105.
54 102 S. Ct. at 946 n.7. Defense counsel asserted that frequently the only evidence of a
juror's state of mind is the juror's own assertions and that any denial of bias by a juror is
inherently suspect. The Court responded that "'one who is trying as an honest man to live
up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an unbiased mind in a
certain matter.'" Id. (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171 (1954)).
5- 102 S. Ct. at 945-46.
56 Id. at 947 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963)).
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the proseuctors' failure to inform the court of Smith's application could
not affect the fairness of the trial and could not, therefore, be the basis of
a valid claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
57
Justice O'Connor concurred in the majority's opinion on the under-
standing that it did not preclude the use of the implied bias doctrine in
appropriate circumstances. 58 While she agreed that a hearing would ad-
equately reveal juror bias in most cases, including Phillips, she was con-
cerned that a hearing may not show juror prejudice in "some extreme
situations." 59 According to Justice O'Connor, the sixth amendment re-
quires that a juror be deemed biased as a matter of law when, for exam-
ple, a juror is an employee of the prosecutor, or when a juror is a relative
of one of the participants in the trial, or when a juror was a witness or
somehow involved in the crime.6° She pointed out that no previous case
precluded the use of the implied bias doctrine in appropriate
situations.
6 1
Justices Brennan and Stevens joined Justice Marshall in dissent.
Justice Marshall argued that, "where the probability of bias is very
high, and where the evidence adduced at a hearing can offer little assur-
ance that prejudice does not exist, the juror should be deemed biased as
a matter of law."' 62 According to Justice Marshall, the Phillips case
presented a situation calling for the application of the implied bias doc-
trine. The probability of Smith's bias in favor of the prosecution was
57 Id. at 948. The majority also noted that the trial court's finding that there was no
evidence of actual bias is presumptively correct under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976) since this
was a habeas corpus action. Id. at 946 (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)).
58 Id. at 948 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 949 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544
(1964)). Justice O'Connor also pointed out that while 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976) does pro-
vide that a state court's findings of facts are presumptively correct in habeas corpus proceed-
ings, the statute also lists exceptions to the general rule:
[A] determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court
of component jurisdiction. . . shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall
establish or it shall otherwise appear...
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State
court proceeding; [or]
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding. ...
102 S. Ct. at 948 n. 1 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In those unusual circumstances in which a
hearing is inadequate to discover bias, one of these exceptions may be utilized to overcome
the presumed correctness of a state court's finding that the juror was not biased. Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring). See also id. at 957 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62 id. at 953 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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enhanced not only by his application to the prosecutor's office during
the trial, but also by his vigorous pursuit of that position.6 3 Justice Mar-
shall also argued that it was unlikely that a post-trial evidentiary hear-
ing would reveal any prejudice on the part of Smith. He pointed out
that any juror is "unlikely to admit that he had been unable to weigh
the evidence fairly."'64 A juror will be especially reluctant to admit bias,
Justice Marshall continued, when the juror knows that it was his own
misconduct which created the doubt as to his impartiality.
65
Justice Marshall disagreed vehemently with the majority's assertion
that the Court had "long held" that an evidentiary hearing is adequate
to resolve all questions of juror bias.6 6 He argued that the Court had
previously employed the implied bias doctrine in those few situations in
which the probability of bias was high and a hearing was not likely to
reveal the bias.67
The dissent also would have affirmed the lower court decisions on
the alternate ground that the prosecutors' misconduct deprived Phillips
of due process of law. Justice Marshall assumed arguendo that the ma-
jority correctly interpreted Brady and Agurs to require a showing of
prejudice.6 According to the dissent, however, Phillips had suffered
such prejudice when the prosecutors failed to disclose Smith's applica-
tion before the jury retired to deliberate. Justice Marshall contended
that if the prosecution had not withheld this information, the trial judge
probably would have replaced Smith with an alternate juror.69 The dis-
63 Id. at 952 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 953 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 955 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent found unworkable Justice O'Connor's
distinction between employees of the prosecutor, to whom the implied bias doctrine should
apply, and those applying for a position with the prosecutor's office, to whom the doctrine
should not apply. Justice Marshall argued that when an applicant's job prospects are at stake
he may be even more "anxious to please" than he would be if he had already secured the
position. Id. at 953 n.8.
66 Id. at 955 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 956-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 957-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Prior Supreme Court decisions unquestionably
support Justice Rehnquist's assertion that "the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of
alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecu-
tor." Id. at 947. In Brady, the Court focused upon the materiality of the withheld evidence.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87. In Agurs the Court noted:
[T]he constitutional obligation is [not to be] measured by the moral culpability, or the
willfulness, of the prosecutor. If evidence highly probative of innocence is in his file, he
should be presumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually overlooked
it. . . .Conversely, if evidence actually has no probative significance at all, no purpose
would be served by requiring a new trial simply because an inept prosecutor incorrectly
believed he was suppressing a fact that would be vital to the defense. If the suppression
of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence,
not the character of the prosecutor.
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 (citation omitted).
69 Id. at 958-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court substituted an alternate juror for
1982] 1515
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sent concluded by stating that "[i]f due process really does mean a full
and fair opportunity to be tried by an unbiased jury, 'capable and will-
ing to decide the case solely on the evidence'--then in this case, due
process has been denied.
'70
III. CRITIQUE OF SMITH V PHILLIPS
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ACTUAL" AND "IMPLIED" BIAS
The majority in Phillips responded to the defendant's implied bias
argument by holding that claims of implied bias are not cognizable
under the sixth amendment guarantee to an impartial jury. The
Supreme Court held that a defendant can establish a sixth amendment
violation only by showing actual bias on the part of a juror.7 1 A clear
grasp of the distinction between "actual bias" and "implied bias" is thus
essential both to an understanding of the radical step which the
Supreme Court has taken in Philh'ps and to an evaluation of its state-
ment that precedent dictated the result.7 2 Although the concepts have
been employed since the early 1800s, the labels "actual bias" and "im-
plied bias" have arisen only within the last twenty years.
An inquiry into "actual bias" involves a determination of a juror's
subjective state of mind,73 which normally turns on the only possible
evidence of a juror's psychological state-the juror's own admission or
denial of bias.74 The juror's testimony renders irrelevant indirect evi-
dence of prejudice, such as a juror's relation to a party.75 Furthermore, a
finding of prejudice normally comes to an appellate court with a strong
presumption of validity because it involves a credibility finding by the
trial judge.7 6 In contrast, inquiries into "implied bias" have involved an
Bethel upon learning of his cooperation with the prosecution. Id. at 958 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
70 Id. at 960 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, 102 S. Ct. at 946).
71 Id. at 945.
72 Id.
73 See Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. at 1370 ("Actual bias may be said to exist where
there is sufficient evidence of a juror's prejudicial state of mind."); BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY
147 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) ("Actual biza consists in the existence of a state of mind on the part of
the juror which satisfies the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, that the juror cannot try
the issues impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challeng-
ing.") (emphasis in original).
74 See Smith v. Phillips, 102 S. Ct. at 951-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe majority
.. .holds that the juror's simple assertion, after the verdict, that he was not biased suffi-
ciently protects respondent's right to trial by an impartial jury."); id. at 946 n.7 ("Respondent
correctly notes that determinations made in ... [actual bias] hearings will frequently turn
upon the testimony of the juror in question .... "); United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980,
984 (2d Cir. 1968) ("[Actual] bias is based upon express proof, e.g., by a voir dire admission
by the prospective juror of a state of mind prejudicial to a party's interest.").
75 See supra note 74.
76 In explaining why Smith's actions did not prevent him from reaching an impartial
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objective determination of the verifiable facts surrounding a juror's rela-
tion to a party,77 a determination which turned on whether the average
man in the juror's situation could render an impartial verdict.' 8 Thus, a
juror's disclaimer of bias was of no consequence.7 9 Finally, a finding of
implied bias was normally reviewable by an appellate court as a ques-
tion of law.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips, a defendant could
show a violation of his right to an impartial jury by means of either the
actual bias doctrine or the implied bias doctrine.8 0 If a juror would not
admit to bias when questioned by a judge, pre-Phillips decisions held
that the defendant could still show a violation of his rights if the average
verdict, the majority simply stated that "[t]he trial judge expressly so found." 102 S. Ct. at
948.
77 See United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1345-46 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1087 (1976) ("[T]here are occasions upon which further questioning is needed to permit
the trial court to make its own judgment of a juror's impartiality based on objective facts,
rather than relying exclusively on the jurors' subjective determinations of whether they were
prejudiced.').
78 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961) (in finding jurors impliedly biased despite
their disclaimers, the Supreme Court noted that widespread adverse publicity was "so persis-
tent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the average man");
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 176 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting); Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510, 532 (1927) ("Every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the aver-
age man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which
might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the state and the ac-
cused, denies the latter due process of law."); United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d at 984;
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g) (a person "may
declare that he feels no prejudice in the case; and yet the law cautiously incapacitates him
from serving on the jury because it suspects prejudice, because in general persons in a similar
situation would feel prejudice'); Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. at 1370. See also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 124 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) ("average man test").
79 See supra note 78. See also United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d at 984 ("The question of
implied bias remains. In determining whether a prospective juror should be excluded on this
ground his statements. . . are totally irrevelant. . . .'); Phillips v. Smith, 485 F. Supp. at
1370 ("Where. . . ajuror. . . is a party to a relationship which, as a matter of law, raises the
presumption of partiality. . . [t]his presumption is conclusive and may not be defeated by
affirmations of neutrality by the juror.').
80 For examples of federal circuit court opinions which have recognized the applicability
of both the implied bias doctrine and the actual bias doctrine to the right to an impartial
jury, without necessarily referring to these concepts by name, see Goins v. McKeen, 605 F.2d
947, 951 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1345-46 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); United States ex rt. Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229,
236-39 (3d Cir. 1973); Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719, 723 (2d Cir. 1970); United States
v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 983-84 (2d Cir. 1968); Jackson v. United States, 395 F.2d 615, 618
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Photostat Corp. v. Ball, 338 F.2d 783, 785 (10th Cir. 1964); United States ex
ref. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364,372-73 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc). Justice Marshall also cites
a number of cases which suggest that the implied bias doctrine should be the basis for grant-
ing a new trial in certain situations. 102 S. Ct. at 957 n.19 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But see
United States v. Kelton, 518 F.2d 531, 533 (8th Cir. 1975) (rejects the applicability of the
implied bias doctrine).
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man in the juror's circumstances would be incapable of rendering a fair
verdict.8' Because these decisions directly contradict the majority's
statement that "the [only] remedy for allegations of juror partiality is
a[n] . . . opportunity to prove actual bias,"82 an examination of the
precedents marshalled in support of the statement is in order.
B. CASES RELIED UPON BY THE MAJORITY
The majority first relied upon Remmer v. United States.8 3 In Remmer I,
the defendant claimed that a juror was biased against him because
someone had approached the juror with a bribe for a favorable ver-
dict.84 The majority in Phillips made much of the fact that the Supreme
Court remanded the case for a hearing into the juror's possible
prejudice. In so doing, it implied that Remmer I demonstrates that the
remedy for claims of juror prejudice is a hearing into actual bias.85 The
majority failed to mention, however, that the Court's subsequent resolu-
tion of this case in Remmer 1186 shows that Remmer I did not hold that a
defendant can only prove a violation of his right to an impartial jury by
proving actual juror bias. At the conclusion of the hearing on remand,
the trial judge found that the juror was not biased, relying upon the
juror's testimony to that effect.87 If the defendant could have succeeded
only proving actual juror bias, this finding would have ended the case.
88
Yet, in Remmer HI, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's right to
an impartial jury had been violated, and it ordered a new trial. The
Supreme Court stated: "We think this evidence . . . reveals such a
state of facts that neither Mr. Smith [the juror] nor anyone else could
say that he was not affected in his freedom of action as a juror."89 In
short, without explicitly identifying it as such, the Court in Remmer II
applied the implied bias doctrine to find a violation of the right to an
impartial jury.go
Similarly, the next group of cases relied upon by the majority sup-
port the viability of the implied bias doctrine and does not establish that
81 Rather than relying upon the traditional "average man" formulation, Justice Marshall
argues that bias should be implied as a matter of law "only when the probability of bias is
particularly great, and when an evidentiary hearing is particularly unlikely to reveal that
bias." 102 S. Ct. at 955 n.14 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The practical difference between the
two formulations is uncertain.
82 Id. at 945.
83 347 U.S. 227 (1954) (Remmer 1).
84 Id. at 228.
85 102 S. Ct. at 945.
86 Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956) (Remmer I).
87 United States v. Remmer, 122 F. Supp. 673, 675 (D. Nev. 1954).
88 See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
89 350 U.S. at 381-82.
90 See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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a defendant's only remedy is to prove actual juror bias. Three cases-
United States v. Wood, 9' Frazier v. United States,92 and Dennis v. United
States93-- reversed the Court's earlier decision in Crawford v. United
States94 that an employee of any branch of the federal government
should be declared impliedly biased whenever the federal government is
a party to a suit.95 These cases, however, only struck down the implied
bias doctrine as defined in the narrow sense that bias will be implied
from the mere fact of governmental employment in cases involving the
federal government. 96 For example, one of these cases held that a de-
fendant convicted of larceny in the District of Columbia could not rely
upon Crawford's implied biased doctrine to have a Treasury Department
clerk declared biased as a matter of law.
97
The cases did not strike down the implied bias doctrine as it is pres-
ently understood. They declared that a defendant has a right to prove
"actual bias," 98 specifically defining "actual bias" to include bias arising
from suspicious circumstances:
The phrase "actual bias" is used in this opinion as it was in the Wood
case. The Wood opinion ... regarded "actual bias" . . . as including not only
prejudice in the subjective sense but also such as might be thought implicito to arise
"in view of the nature or circumstances of his employment, or of the relation of the
particular governmental activity to the matters involved in the prosecu-
tion, or otherwise." 99
In holding that a defendant has a right to show "actual bias" as thus
defined, Wood, Frazier, and Dennis allow a defendant to show juror bias
from the particular circumstances surrounding a juror's relation to a
91 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
92 335 U.S. 497 (1948).
93 339 U.S. 162 (1950).
94 212 U.S. 183 (1909), overrmded in part, 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
95 Between the Crawford and Wood decisions, Congress passed an act that removed the per
se qualification of all government employees from jury service in suits involving the federal
government. Act of Congress of August 22, 1935, D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 11-2302 (West
1966). Congress passed this legislation to overcome the problems that the Crawford decision
had caused in the District of Columbia. As of 1935, the Crawford ruling disqualified over 44%
of the otherwise qualified jurors in the nation's capital whenever the federal government was
a party to the suit. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 508 n.17 (1948). In view of the
"public need," the Wood Court upheld the constitutionality of the act. 299 U.S. at 148-49.
96 See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. at 141 ("[W]e are unable to accept the ruling in
the Crawford case. . . that the mere fact of a governmental employment, unrelated to the
particular issues or circumstances of a criminal prosecution, created an absolute disqualifica-
tion to serve as a juror in a criminal case."). See aro Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. at 172;
Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. at 508 n.17.
97 United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
98 339 U.S. at 171-72; 335 U.S. at 510; 299 U.S. at 133.
99 Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. at 510 n. 19 (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 U.S.
at 133-34) (emphasis added).
1982] 1519
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
party. Ioo
Chandler v. Florida 101 is the final case relied upon by the majority to
establish the proposition that the Court had "long held" that a defend-
ant can show a violation of his right to an impartial jury only by prov-
ing actual juror bias. The Supreme Court in Chandler again did not use
the phrases "implied bias" and "actual bias." If the opinion is read in
terms of these concepts, however, it becomes evident that the case does
not support the majority's position.
The defendant in Chandler argued that the sixth amendment com-
mands an absolute ban on all broadcast coverage of a defendant's crimi-
nal trial unless the defendant consents to the publicity.102 In analyzing
this claim, the Supreme Court in Chandler applied the principle of the
implied bias doctrine: if broadcasting per se "invariably and uniformly
affected the conduct of participants so as to impair fundamental fair-
ness, our task would be simple: prohibition of broadcast coverage of
trials would be required."' 0 3 The Court did not find the broadcasting
would invariably prejudice jurors, but it did note that defendants re-
mained free to show prejudice from particular circumstances, such as
those present in a "Roman circus" or a "Yankee Stadium" atmos-
phere. 0 4 The Court also expressly disavowed reliance on the jurors' tes-
timony that the broadcasting would not affect their verdict. 10 5 Thus,
the Court in Chandler applied the principles of the implied bias doctrine
rather than holding that the doctrine has no vitality, as the majority in
Philh's implied.
C. THE WISDOM OF ABANDONING THE "IMPLIED BIAS" DOCTRINE
The majority in Philh'ps did not articulate a rationale for its posi-
tion that the opportunity to prove actual bias adequately protects a de-
fendant's right to an impartial jury. Rather, the majority relied upon
precedents which do not support its conclusion. I°6 The majority makes
hollow the guarantee of the sixth amendment when it conditions a de-
fendant's right to an impartial jury upon the statements of the allegedly
biased juror. If the circumstances indicate prejudice, the sixth amend-
ment should require that the juror be deemed prejudiced as a matter of
law. A number of opinions support this argument.
100 See 49 MICH. L. REv. 130, 132 & n.15 (1950).
101 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
102 Id. at 574-75.
103 Id. at 575.
104 Id. at 582.
105 Id. at 581.
106 See supra text accompanying notes 83-105.
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In 1807, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the position of the Phillips
majority in the trial of Aaron Burr:
The end to be obtained is an impartial jury; to secure this end, a man is
prohibited from serving on it whose connection with a party is such as to
induce a suspicion of partiality. The relationship may be remote; the per-
son may never have seen the party; he may declare that he feels no prejudice in
the case, and yet the law cautiously incapacitates him from serving on the jug be-
cause in general persons in.a similar situation would feel prejudice.'
0 7
Chief Justice Marshall first formulated what is now referred to as the
''average man" test to be applied when a juror's impartiality is at issue:
"Those who try the impartiality of a juror ought to. . . determine, ac-
cording to their best judgment, whether in general men under such cir-
cumstances ought to be considered as capable of hearing fairly. . . the
testimony which may be offered to them. . .. "108
In Crawford v. United States, the Supreme Court unanimously reaf-
firmed the applicability of the implied bias doctrine in some situations:
Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most
difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence, and it might
exist in the mind of one (on account of his relations with one of the parties)
who was quite positive that he had no bias, and said that he was perfectly able to
decide the question wholly uninftuenced by anything but the evidence. The law there-
fore most wisely says that with regard to some of the relations which may
exist between the juror and one of the parties, bias is implied, and evidence
of its actual existence need not be given. 109
Justices Black and Frankfurter next confronted the issue of implied
bias in their dissenting opinions in Dennis. Justice Black pointed out:
"The test of bias. . . is not what the particular juror believes he could
do."" 10 Justice Frankfurter went further and explained the rationale for
what is now known as the "implied bias" doctrine:
The constitutional command for trial by an "impartial jury" casts
upon the judiciary the exercise of judgment in determining the circum-
107 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g) (emphasis
added).
108 Id. at 51. Chief Justice Marshall prefaced his opinion with the following observation:
The great value of the trial by jury certainly consists in its fairness and impartiality.
Those who most prize the institution, prize it because it furnishes a tribunal which may
be expected to be uninfluenced by an undue bias of the mind. I have always conceived,
and still conceive, an impartial jury as required by the common law, and as secured by
the constitution, must be composed of men who will fairly hear the testimony which may
be offered to them, and bring their verdict according to that testimony, and according to
the law arising on it. This is not to be expected, certainly the law does not expect it,
where the jurors, before they hear the testimony, have deliberately formed and delivered
an opinion that the person whom they are to try is guilty or innocent of the charge
alleged against him.
Id. at 50.
109 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909) (emphasis added), overruled on other groundr, United States v.
Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936).
110 339 U.S. at 176 (Black, J., dissenting).
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stances which preclude that free, fearless and disinterested capacity in ana-
lyzing evidence which is indispensable if jurymen are to deal impartially
with an accusation. The judgment that a court must thus exercise in find-
ing "disqualification for bias" of persons who belong to a particular class is
a psychological judgment. It is a judgment founded on human experience
and not on technical learning ....
The reason for disqualifying a whole class on the ground of bias is the
law's recognition that if the circumstances of that class in the run of in-
stances are likely to generate bias, consciously or unconsciously, it would
be a hopeless endeavor to search out the impact of these circumstances on
the mind and judgment of a particular individual.'I'
In Irvin v. Dodd,' 12 a decision post-dating four of the five decisions
relied upon by the majority in Philh's, the Supreme Court unanimously
applied the "implied bias" doctrine sub silento to overturn the conviction
of a defendant. The defendant in Irvin was tried in a community highly
prejudiced against him because of massive pre-trial publicity. The trial
judge personally examined each member of the jury, and each juror in-
dicated that he could be impartial.' 3 Although the defendant made no
showing of "actual bias," the Court declared his conviction void. "No
doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and
impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a
declaration before one's fellows is often its father."' 1 4 "[A]ccounting for
the frailties of human nature-we can only say that in light of the cir-
cumstances here the finding of impartiality does not meet constitutional
standards."' 15
Similarly, in Leonard v. United States, 1 6 the Supreme Court agreed
with the Solicitor General that certain individuals should be "automati-
cally disqualified" from serving as jurors. 1 7 The defendant in Leonard
received two separate trials for closely related crimes. At the conclusion
of the first trial, the jury announced its guilty verdict in the presence of
five jurors who were to sit on the jury in the second trial. The Court
reversed the second jury's finding that the defendant was guilty, holding
that the procedure followed by the district court was plainly errone-
ous. 118 In Turner v. Louisiana, 1 9 the Court once again overturned a con-
viction as violative of the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury
although the defendant produced no evidence of the jury's actual
''' Id. at 181 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also id. at 175-81 (Black, J., dissenting).
112 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
113 Id. at 724.
'14 Id. at 728.
115 Id. at 727-28.
116 378 U.S. 544 (1964) (per curiarn).
117 Id. at 545.
118 Id.
119 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
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bias.120 The Turner Court decided that "it would be blinking reality not
to recognize the extreme prejudice inherent in [a] continual association
throughout the trial between the jurors and. . . two key witnesses for
the prosecution."
12 '
Thus, the majority in Phillips took issue with the wisdom of many
prior opinions of the Supreme Court when it decided to take the unprec-
edented step of abolishing the implied bias doctrine. Perhaps the judi-
cial safeguards of voir dire and peremptory challenges eliminate the
need for the doctrine in most cases, since these safeguards themselves
help to ensure the impartiality of ajury.122 Phillips, however, shows that
these safeguards are far from infallible. During voir dire, Phillips's
counsel asked juror Smith about his future employment plans. Smith
responded that he planned to obtain overseas employment with the Fed-
eral Drug Enforcement Agency.' 23 There was nothing more that Phil-
lips's counsel could have asked at that time regarding Smith's bias. It
was impossible for the defendant to elicit the prejudicial circumstances
during voir dire, and hence to have reason to exercise a peremptory
challenge, since Smith had not yet applied for the position with the Dis-
trict Attorney's office.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision to abandon the implied bias doc-
trine as a safeguard to the right to an impartial jury was not dictated by
precedent. Indeed, prior opinions uniformly argued for the position
that the doctrine served a necessary role in protecting sixth amendment
rights of defendants. If the Supreme Court had applied the doctrine to
the facts in Phillips, it may well have ordered a new trial. Any judgment
"founded upon human experience"' 24 would conclude that a juror vig-
orously applying for a position with the office prosecuting the defendant
may well favor the position of his prospective employer. 125 Because of
120 Id. at 474 (Clark, J., dissenting).
121 Id. at 473.
122 See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
123 87 Misc. 2d at 619, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
124 Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. at 181 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See supra text
accompanying note 111.
125 Cf. Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 392 So. 2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(employee of hospital where defendant was president, chief of staff, and member of board of
directors declared impliedly biased, despite employee's assertions to the contrary); Haak v.
State, - Ind. -, 417 N.E.2d 321 (1981) (wife of man who accepted position with district
attorney's office which was prosecuting defendant held impliedly biased, despite her disclaim-
ers); State v. Simmons, 390 So. 2d 1317 (La. 1980) (deputy sheriff who worked closely with
district attorney's office impliedly biased, despite disclaimers to the contrary); People v.
Branch, 59 A.D.2d 459, 399 N.Y.S.2d 930 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), af'd, 49 N.Y.2d 645, 389
N.E.2d 467, 415 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1979) (part-time police officer who in the past worked profes-
1982] 1523
1524 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 73
this truism, Phillips's conviction should have been reversed as violative
of the sixth amendment.
SHARON R. GROMER
sionally with the presenting prosecutor deemed impliedly biased in criminal case, despite
disclaimers).
